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MUSICAL AFFECTS AND THE LIFE OF FAITH:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE
RELIGIOUS POTENCY OF MUSIC
Mark Wynn

The paper argues that the religious suggestiveness of music can be illuminated by reference to a number of themes drawn from contemporary philosophy of music, in particular the idea that the affective states expressed in
music lack material objects, are often grasped "sympathetically," may
escape verbalisation, and lack action-guiding content. Together these
themes suggest that music may express, and enable its hearers to take on,
an affectively laden "world-view." The paper explores the thought that
such "attitudes" may be religiously important not only in setting the affective tone of our relationship to the world, but also in relationship to God.

It has long been supposed that among the arts, music has a preeminent

claim to religious or metaphysical significance. In this paper, I shall argue
that this ancient theme can be substantiated in the terms provided by
recent discussion in the philosophy of music. Specifically, I shall examine
the idea that music is religiously potent because of its implications for the
quality of our felt responses to the world. I begin with some brief general
remarks on the emotions, before considering the relationship between
music and the emotions. I shall then apply these reflections to the question
of how music may be religiously important.
I. The emotions

For the purposes of this discussion, I shall follow Robert Roberts and think
of the emotions as serious concern-based construals.1 On this account, my
being afraid of a dog, for example, is a matter of my construing the dog as
dangerous, and doing this "concemfully," that is, in such a way as to take
the dog to pose a threat to something I value. More exactly, it is enough
that the dog should appear to me to pose a threat, even if I would not
assert as much: in that case, the construal will count as "serious." While
analytically distinguishable, these various elements of construal, concern
and seriousness constitute an integrated state of mind in their life setting.
For instance, my construal of an interviewer as threatening may involve
my taking her to be powerful and contemptuous, where these qualities are
"filtered through" my concern to make a favourable impression.'
On Roberts' account, our construal of situations lies to some degree
within our control, and accordingly, in certain cases, we can choose which
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emotion to feel. For instance, if I am taking a significant risk in order to rescue someone, then I may well feel fear; but this emotion can be overcome,
at least in principle, by refocusing my attention, so that I construe the situation not as one of risk, but as an opportunity to bring someone to safety. In
this case, there need be no shift in my judgement about whether or not the
situation is indeed dangerous (such a shift may well lie outside my control); instead, the change has to do with which aspects of the situation are
salient in my construal of it?
Drawing on this same analytical framework, Roberts also seeks to
understand the relationship of actions and physiological states to the emotions. For example, in envy my concern for self-esteem may be channelled
through my construal of someone as a rival for recognition, with the result
that I behave in ways that are calculated to undermine his reputation. 4
(Hence emotions may themselves generate concerns, in this instance the
concern to undermine a person's reputation.) Roberts also allows, naturally, that sensations are typical of many emotions. And he adds that we may
come to adopt a certain concernful construal of a situation on feeling a sensation of the kind that is often conjoined with that sort of construal. For
instance, the sensation of blushing may contribute to my sense that I have
done something embarrassing.s
ntis account of the emotions as unified states of mind, which can be
understood in terms of the notions of construat concern and seriousness,
while briet will suffice I think for our purposes.
II. Music and the emotions

There is a long-standing tradition of associating music with the emotions. 6
Despite the antiquity of this theme, there continues to be disagreement
over how this relationship is to be understood. Drawing on two recent
works on the subject, I shall set out one general approach to these issues.
Although written independently of one another, these two works agree in
broad outline, and while there are, of course, other schools of thought, the
account expounded here commands enough respect within the philosophy
of music to provide, I suggest, a worthwhile starting point for our enquiry.
On some views, "pure" or "absolute" music (including symphonies,
string quartets and other instrumental works) is incapable of expressing
definite emotions, because it cannot express thoughts, and the differentiae
of the emotions are given by the different thoughts (or construals) of which
they are constituted. On this understanding, while music may be the occasion for the formation of various emotions, the connection is one of adventitious association, and accordingly variable from person to person and
time t9 time, and of no value for understanding the intrinsic character of
music. The authors I wish to examine both contest this claim.
In his book Music, Value and the Passions, Aaron Ridley argues that the
association between music and various affective states need not be merely
subjective, or a matter simply of convention, but can be grounded in the
resemblance which music may bear to the human voice and the expressive
movements of bodies, especially the human body. Hence he sees vocal and
dynamic "melisma" as the key to music's expressiveness. 8 Following
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Ridley, I shall take dynamic melisma as the more important case, and confine my comments to this case.
To illustrate dynamic melisma, Ridley considers the first eight bars of
the funeral march in Beethoven's Eroica symphony, and in this connection
he takes issue with Donald Ferguson's reading of this same passage for
reasons that have some bearing on our topic. Ferguson writes: "Grief permeates every note and every rhythmic step; but there is no yielding - no
indulgence in the alleviating misery of tears. It comprehends heroically
and is unafraid."" While acknowledging the sensitivity of Ferguson's
account to the particular movements and tensions of the passage, Ridley
objects that he over-describes the music in rather the way that it would be
over-described if we took the music to recount the movements of a beetle
struggling to push some dung over a series of mounds. Both the case of the
beetle and the case picked out by Ferguson's description, Ridley argues, fit
the music to the extent that both involve movements of the kind that are
embodied in the music, that is, movements that suggest "perseverance, fortitude, firmness" and other such qualities. lO But the music falls short of
identifying particular states of affairs of the kind that we would require to
weave a story around such movements. Clearly, the music stops short of
describing a beetle; but on Ridley's view, it also lacks the kind of representational power that is presupposed in Ferguson's account, and specifically
it lacks the capacity to represent the thought that someone has suffered a
loss, a thought which Ridley takes to be necessary if a state of mind is to
count as grief. Hence Ridley writes that while Ferguson's description of the
music as "slow," "heavy," "effortful," and so on, may carry conviction:
his claim that" grief permeates every note" cannot be justified in the
same way; for the difference between grief and profound sadness is
that grief quite specifically involves the loss of something loved, and
the movements of music could never suggest that. l1
To this it may be objected: even if a piece of music cannot express Mary's
grieving (because it cannot represent individuals), why should it not express
grief considered abstractly? Ridley's position here turns on the thought that
the expressive power of a piece such as the funeral march is grounded in the
resemblance between its movements and the expressive movements of bodies. So his claim that the march cannot express grief as distinct from profound sadness comes down to this thought: either these two states cannot be
differentiated from one another simply by reference to the patterns of
expressive behaviour with which each is associated, or if they can be so differentiated, then the movements of a piece of music fail to present any correlative distinction. Ridley endorses this thought, I suggest, because he thinks
that grief can be distinguished from profound sadness only by introducing
an element of narrative. For whereas profound sadness need have no narrative component (a person can just feel sad, where this sadness has no particular reference), grief involves reference to the sustaining of a loss. And our
expressive behaviour (or at any rate expressive behaviour of the kind that
can bear a resemblance to the movements of a piece of music) is not sufficiently discriminating, he thinks, to pick out this narrative structure.
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Similarly, we might suppose that envy, remorse and embarrassment, for
instance, all have a narrative component: if I feel envy, then I construe
someone as enjoying a benefit, and (as Roberts notes) various prospective
actions are likely to be implied thereby; and if I feel remorse, then I construe
myself as having done wrong, and at least implicitly commit myself to
righting the wrong if the opportunity should arise; and if I feel embarrassment, then I construe myself as being in a condition that may lower my
standing in the eyes of others, and at ll~ast implicitly I am committed to
removing this condition if able to do so. Ridley's view, then, is that music
cannot express emotions of these kinds; for they are defined by their narrative E,tructure, and this structure can only be picked out by reference to particular states of affairs, and these states of affairs cannot be identified simply
by reference to patterns of expressive behaviour. Hence, he proposes, music
expresses not so much emotions as what are commonly called "moods,"
that is, affective states shorn of any reference to particular states of affairs.
Among moods, we may include melancholy, sadness, elation and joy,
where these states infuse our experience of the world in some relatively
general way, rather than having a specific state of affairs as their target.
Ridley chooses to define such states as "feelings." Feelings, he notes,
lack "material objects" (that is, concrete objects), but they do have "formal
objects." For example, if I get out of bed and feel a generalised depression,
then there is nothing in particular about which I am depressed (my affective state has no material or concrete object); instead, things in general are
felt to fall under the description "profoundly unpromising" (where this
description gives the formal object of depression)Y Such states of feeling,
Ridley comments, may "colour our world." And if we wish to think of
them taking a material object, then that object may best be thought of as
simply "the world."14
So far we have seen that Ridley subscribes to these two claims: "pure"
music expresses affective states by virtue of the resemblance between its
movements and the expressive movements of bodies, especially the human
body; and accordingly, music can express "feelings" or moods but not
"emotions," since it cannot pick out the particular states of affairs (involving loss, wrong-doing or whatever it may be) which serve to differentiate
the emotions. There is one further aspect of Ridley'S account that I wish to
introduce for present purposes. Ridley wonders how it is that we manage
to recognise the resemblance between the movements of a piece of music
and the movements of human beings or other creaturesY He notes that
sometimes we can register in a purely dispassionate way how the dynamic
qualities of a piece of music resemble the bodily movements of (for example) human beings, where these movements are expressive of feeling.
(Perhaps rather unhelpfully, he speaks of this as a "robotic" recognition of
the resemblance; in other words, it is the sort of recognition that does not
depend upon the quality of our felt response to the music.) But often, he
suggests, particularly with unfamiliar pieces, we come to identify the states
of feeling expressed in the music by virtue of our affective responses. This
sort of recognition involves a mirroring response to the music, so that the
character of the music's expressiveness is grasped by way of the feeling
that it engenders in us:
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It is rather like my coming to appreciate the melancholy of a weeping
willow only as the willow saddens me: I could, of course, merely
identify the expressive posture that the willow's posture resembles;
but instead I apprehend its melancholy through a kind of mirroring
response. I respond to it sympathetically.!6
It is worth emphasising that Ridley is not endorsing a simple "arousal"
account of the expressiveness of music. What makes a piece of music
"sad," for example, is not that it typically arouses in its listeners a response
of sadness. On the contrary, it is the fact that the music is sad that explains
why it gives rise to this sort of response. Its sadness is to be understood
then not in terms of the affects it arouses, but in terms of the resemblance
between the music's dynamic qualities and the movements of bodies
where these movements are expressive of sadness. So the expressiveness of
a piece of music consists not in the fact that it simply calls to mind certain
states of feeling (the "robotic" case), nor in the fact that it causes certain
states of feeling (the mirroring response case), but in the fact of resemblance between the movements of music and the expressive movements of
bodies, where this resemblance can in principle be grasped either sympathetically or dispassionately.
We have seen that on Ridley's view, while music is capable of expressing
for instance sadness, it cannot express grief, or we might add pity, since
these emotions are individuated by reference to particular states of affairs,
and music lacks the representational power to pick out particular states of
affairs. This might suggest that music can express at most a relatively indeterminate kind of affective state - sadness in general rather than a particular variety of sadness such as grief or pity. However, Ridley adds that
where the expressive force of a piece of music is recognised by means of a
mirroring response, then its expressiveness assumes a very precise character, which can be specified by reference to the particular episode of feeling
that the listener experiences: here the music is taken to express not just sadness, but the kind of sadness which has precisely this phenomenological
feel. In this way, Ridley feels able to endorse Mendelssohn's often cited
remark that "a piece of music that I love expresses thoughts to me that are
not too imprecise to be framed in words, but too precise."!7 Of course, in
elaborating his theory in this way, Ridley is after all endorsing a form, albeit
a "weak" form, of the arousal theory: in general terms, it is the resemblance
between the movements of music and of the body which grounds the possibility of music's expressiveness, but it is by virtue of our felt responses that
we are able to ascribe to music a really precise expressive significance (a significance which may exceed our powers of description).!8 Ridley insists,
however, that these felt responses, which enable us to attribute to music a
very particular expressive force, are not merely conventional, or based on
personal associations of some kind, but grounded in the character of the
music itself, and above all in its dynamic melismatic properties.
I turn now to examine, more briefly, another account of musical expressiveness, one which is broadly in agreement with Ridley's approach. Like
Ridley, Stephen Davies addresses his remarks to the claim of Eduard
Hanslick and others that music cannot express definite emotions because it
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cannot capture the thoughts of which they are constituted, and that a
music critic should therefore take no interest in the affective responses
aroused by a piece of music. 19 As we have seen, Ridley responds to this
proposal by supposing that not all affective states need be counted as emotions, and that music expresses moods or feelings, rather than emotions in
the strict sense. Davies also thinks that reference to objectless affective
states provides the best way of turning aside Hanslick's challenge, and like
Ridley he makes reference to weeping willows, and also to the face of St
Bernard dogs, to explain how something may be expressive of an affective
state, without our having to suppose that this state is directed at a particular state of affairs, or that it is felt at a11.20 Like weeping willows and St
Bernard dogs, Davies suggests, music is expressive because it presents
"emotion characteristics in appearance" (in other words, because it captures the look we associate with various states of emotion).21 However,
whereas the willow is expressive because of its shape, music is expressive
on account of its dynamic character, and the resemblance this bears to
hum'ill beings' gait, bearing, carriage and so on.
Moreover, like Ridley, Davies supposes that music sometimes arouses the
affective states of which it is expressive (though again like Ridley, he rejects
simple forms of the arousal theory: the expressive force of a piece of music is
not to be reduced to its tendency to arouse a given affective response in its
listeners.) Moreover, he maintains that these mirroring feelings remain
"uncluttered by the motives, desires, and the need to act that are their usual
accompaniments."22 Again, this is not least because the feelings in question
lack a material object, and are therefore abstracted from the specificity of
context that usually underpins the action-guiding character of an affective
state. (Compare Roberts on envy.) We can explain in the same way the comparative mildness of the feelings aroused by music, in so far as relatively
intense affective episodes are typically informed by beliefs about particular
states of affairs. Lastly, Davies echoes Ridley'S thought that the affective
states expressed in music can infuse our experience in general. Hence he
comments that because the feelings expressed in music lack material objects,
they can be taken to express "the composer's experience of affective life in
general."23 However, Davies notes that, even so, a mirroring response to
music is not simply an objectless mood. It is true that such responses may
lack an "emotional object" (for instance, when I am moved to sadness I need
not be sad about anything in particular), but they still have a perceptual
object (the music itself).24 Hence they are like perceptual object generated
moods (see again the examples of the willow and 5t Bernard).
So Davies' account is broadly in agreement with Ridley's. There are some
differences of emphasis, however. Notably Davies does not give much attention to Mendelssohn's thought about the precision and consequent ineffability of the feelings expressed in music. But when he does make reference to
this idea, citing Mendelssohn, he does not dispute the suggestion that the
affects aroused in mirroring responses to music may escape verbalisation; he
just rejects the idea that this feature of musical experience is distinctive or of
any importance for understanding its expressive power: "the most mundane
perceptual experiences," he writes, "lead to the acquisition of ineffable truths
- for example, that the apple in front of me has a distinctive hue. Such facts
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are usually of no special importance. They do not comprise inexpressible
knowledge of a type that anyone is likely to feel compelled or inspired to
communicate."25 So while Davies does not dispute Ridley's claim about the
particularity of our responses, he does not assign this fact the same significance in understanding the expressive force of music.
In summary, the works of Ridley and Davies reveal a striking consensus
on the following issues. Firstly, the affective states expressed in music lack
material objects. To put the matter in Davies's terms, they are states of the
kind that can be communicated by an emotion characteristic in appearance, and therefore states which can in principle be expressed by someone's (dynamic) appearance without our knowing what he or she is thinking. Accordingly, both authors suppose that "pure" music cannot express,
for instance, remorse, embarrassment, or envy, but can express sadness
and happiness. Moreover, since they lack material objects, the affective
states expressed in music are capable in principle of suffusing our experience in general, or "colouring our world." And while they reject simple
arousal theories of musical expressiveness, Ridley and Davies also agree
that we often come to recognise the expressive significance of a piece of
music by way of a mirroring response, where this response may be too
precise to be captured in all its particularity in words.
It is worth noting that similar themes emerge in some other, rather different responses to the claim that music cannot express particular emotions
because it cannot express the thoughts of which they are constituted. For
example, Geoffrey Maddell has argued that the affective states expressed
in music do after all have a "material" or "emotional" object, namely, the
movements of the music itself, and accordingly music is capable of
expressing emotions in the everyday sense:
It is false that music can evoke emotion only if it can represent some

extra-musical object of that emotion. The object of desire, or quasilonging, is not some extra-musical state of affairs, but a feature of the
music itself, viz., the resolution on the tonic. That is not a state of
affairs which is represented by the music; it is a feature of the music. 26
Although adopting this rather different theoretical framework (one which
takes the music to have a material object supplied by the tonal and harmonic features of the work itself, and which has no use for the idea that
music bears a resemblance to human expressive behaviour), Maddell still
endorses two of the themes that we have identified in the work of Davies
and Ridley. He agrees that we often recognise the expressive force of a
piece of music by way of a mirroring or sympathetic response;27 and he
agrees that "the distinctive balance of intentional affective responses
evoked by music may be too subtle for words to capture."28
Finally, it is worth casting some of these observations about the character of the affective states expressed in music in the terms provided by
Roberts' theory. In particular, we might ask how Roberts' account may be
applied to the mirroring responses that are central to the discussions of
Ridley and Davies. Although Roberts does not allude to moods in the
paper I expounded earlier, these responses can be treated as concernful
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construals, I suggest, albeit that "moody" concerns and construals are distinctive since they make no reference to particular states of affairs. For
instance, a listener who responds sympathetically to a piece of music may
find herself feeling an object-less depression, whereby things in general are
taken to be profoundly unpromising, without any particular state of affairs
being picked out in these terms, or treated as an object of concern.
As we have seen, because mirroring responses fail to identify particular
states of affairs, we should also expect any concomitant concerns to be relatively mild. Ridley provides a further perspective on this thought when
considering the question of why people should choose to listen to sad
music. (After all, who would want to experience a mirroring response of
sadness?) To meet this difficulty he suggests that emotions such as grief,
humiliation, shame and jealousy are all necessarily unpleasant for their
subjects, because they all necessarily involve reference to some sort of difficulty or reversal in the subject's circumstances. By contrast, he comments,
the affective states experienced in mirroring responses to music make no
reference to the subject's circumstances, and are therefore not necessarily
unpieasanU9 Hence the concerns which arise in this connection will tend to
be rdatively mild, for they will lack the element of frustrated self-regard
that is characteristic of states such as humiliation. For the same sorts of reason, to revert to a point made by Davies, we may expect mirroring
responses to lack the action-guiding force that is typical of affective states
which pick out a particular context, and to be devoid of the powerful sensations that accompany certain emotions. Lastly, mirroring responses may
also be said to be "serious" in Roberts' sense, in so far as things in general
have the appearance of being (for example) profoundly unpromising, even
if the subject of the experience would decline to assert that this is in fact
how things stand.
III. The religious power of music
Drawing upon the work of Ridley and Davies, we have seen that there is a
degree of consensus on the character of the affective states which can be
expressed in music. The following claims seem to be especially significant
for an account of the religious significance of music:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Music is expressive of (material) object-less or mood-like affective states.
The expressive force of a musical work can be appreciated by
way of a sympathetic response, whereby the listener takes on
the affective state herself.
The affective states expressed in music may be too precise to be
identified in all their particularity in words.
The affects that are evoked in sympathetic responses to music
are lacking in self-reference and (as Davies puts it) "uncluttered
by the motives, desires, and the need to act that are their usual
accompaniments."

I shall explore the implications of (1)-(4) in tum, with a view to identifying
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several distinct respects in which music may be said to bear a religious
significance.
Following Ridley, we may distinguish between "feelings" (in his sense,
i.e. affective states which lack a material object) and the "quality of an affective life."30 The quality of a person's affective life has to do with the kinds of
affective response to which they are predisposed in general, that is, regardless of the particular circumstances in which they find themselves. For
instance, if the affective tone of my life is one of timidity, then I will tend to
construe the world as threatening, and will be predisposed therefore to
experience episodes of fear. Hence the quality of a person's affective life
amounts to a kind of implicit Weltanschauung, that is, a sense of the significance of the world, where this sense may well lack any theoretical articulation. Now a person who is experiencing a "feeling" of timidity resembles
someone whose quality of affective life is timorous to this extent: while the
mood lasts, he will be inclined to construe his environment in general as
threatening. In so far therefore as music is expressive of "feelings" in
Ridley'S sense, it is also expressive of something like a world-view, that is,
an affectively laden way of reading the significance of things in general.
Now the religions are, of course, typically concerned to inculcate worldviews of this kind, in so far as they seek to promote some generalised,
affectively toned sense of the significance of human experience, a sense
that extends not just to this set of circumstances or that, but to a person's
life in its entirety. This is part of what is involved, for example, in stories of
creation and the end-time: such stories serve to frame human experience in
an utterly general way, so providing a larger context in terms of which we
can assess the significance of the particular states of affairs with which we
reckon in day-to-day living. Suppose for instance that a faith tradition
emphasises the operation of divine providence in the workings of the
world. Such a tradition will find a state of habitual timidity inappropriate
(at any rate where such fearfulness is directed at the way things tum out in
the world); and accordingly, we would expect members of this tradition to
aspire to a rather different quality of affective life, one marked by a greater
degree of confidence in the workings of the world.
Contrary to the spirit of this example, some commentators have supposed
that it is generalised affects that come first, and that metaphYSical systems
can be "read off" from such affects. For example, Pierre Hadot has argued
that the ancient schools of philosophy were concerned with "philosophical
discourse" (an abstract, metaphYSical account of the nature of things) only in
so far as such discourse helped to foster an affectively toned sense of the
meaning of things whose appropriateness was already evident. Hence he
suggests that the basic Stoic attitude was one of "tension" and "duty" or vigilance, and the Epicurean attitude one of "serenity" and the "joy of existing."31 (These attitudes we can interpret as "feelings," I suggest.) And he proposes that the Stoic and Epicurean metaphYSical systems were constructed
simply for the sake of instilling general attitudes of these kinds. In a similar
vein, William James has argued that metaphysical perspectives are answerable to prior affective orientations of a general character. He notes, for example, that any metaphYSical system which required an attitude to everxday
experience of fear, disgust, despair and doubt would be unsustainable. For
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the purposes of our discussion, there is no need to resolve this dispute about
the priority of the quality of an affective life vis-a-vis a metaphysical worldview. It is enough to note that there is a close relationship between the two,
in whichever direction the dependence nms. (Indeed, it seems most likely
that there will be a degree of reciprocal influence.)
So here is a first respect in which musical expressiveness proves to be
religiously significant: the religions seek to inculcate a certain quality of
affective life, and the affective states expressed in music (because they lack
material objects) can be taken to represent various qualities of affective life.
Moreover - turning now to the second point on our list - it is not just
that music enables us to identify abstractly various ways of apprehending
the world in general from an affective point of view. On the contrary, in so
far as the expressiveness of a piece of music is grasped by way of a mirroring response, we will find ourselves experiencing first hand the correlative
"feeling" or mood. Ridley puts the point thus:
Music, then, ... can be expressive of attitudes. For in coming, through
certain pieces of music, to grasp the dominant character of an affective
life not our own, we may also become aware of the attitude toward
the world embodied in it, as the attitude inherent in the feeling which,
sympathetically, we experience. Thus, in grasping the dominant affective character of Beethoven's Eighth Symphony we become aware of
what it would be like to have a cheerful outlook on the world, what it
would be like to think the world amenable and uplifting."
So musical expressiveness is religiously relevant not only in so far as it
reveals various possible qualities of affective life, but also because the "feelings" expressed in music can be apprehended in such a way that we come
to know "from inside" what it is like to have such feelings. Accordingly,
music can shape the quality of our own affective response to the world in
new ways, at any rate while the mood engendered by the music lasts.
We might ask next whether musical experience can also effect a more
enduring transformation of a person's affective sensibility. Here it is worth
recalling Roberts' comments on how the emotions fall within our control in
so far as we are free to choose which construal of a situation to adopt. Now,
as we have seen, in so far as they are mood-like, mirroring responses to
music present us with various general construals of things. And accordingly, by drawing various construals to our attention, and allowing us to adopt
them first hand for a time, mirroring responses to music may enlarge our
repertoire of generalised construals of the world; and thereby they may
help us to make a choice between various such construals. It is also possible
that if we are exposed to a given construal often enough, through our
immersion in a particular musical tradition, then adopting that construal
may become to some degree habitual, independently of any deliberate exercise of choice. In this way, a person may find themselves drawn into a certain quality of affective life simply by virtue of their participation in a musical tradition. It may be that we can understand this phenomenon in part by
reference to Roberts' comments on how a sensation (such as blushing) may
lead it person to construe their situation in a way that conforms to the sensa-
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tion. Analogously, we might suppose that if a person finds themselves (at
all frequently) in the position of construing things in general as, for example, "amenable" and "uplifting" (on account of a mirroring response to
music), then they may be led to suppose, perhaps somewhat unreflectively,
that this is indeed the nature of their circumstances.
So far I have been talking about the in principle relevance of musical
expressiveness to religious concerns without any consideration of how an
explicitly religious context may contribute to the expressiveness of music. If
we follow the analysis of Ridley and Davies, we shall have to say that the
expressiveness of a particular piece (played in a certain way) will not vary
across secular and religious contexts, for both authors are insistent that
expressiveness is a property of the music itself (relating above all to its
dynamic properties). However, context may make a difference to the way in
which a piece is played, and where several such interpretations are equally
valid, but give rise to differences of dynamic property, we may suppose
that context can indirectly make a difference to musical expressiveness. But
quite apart from its contribution to expressiveness, a change of context may
of course make a difference to the kinds of affect which the listener is likely
to experience; for a listener's affective state may reflect both their mirroring
response to qualities inherent in the music and also the setting in which the
music is heard. An explicitly religious setting can also ensure that the general construals that are typical of mirroring responses are interpreted in new
ways, without necessarily making any difference to the quality of feeling
aroused by the music. For example, in listening to the AgllllS Dei of a Byrd
mass, I may experience a generalised feeling of peace, and if the music is
heard in its liturgical context, or if the words are given serious consideration, then this feeling can be assigned a precise, religious meaning: the
peace I feel is a peace befitting my situation as one whose sins have been
taken away. Here the more detailed construal supplied by the words, or by
the larger religious context, does not change the particular, mood-like quality of the mirroring response, but it enables me to see that generalised feeling
as befitting a particular state of affairs, albeit one that is seen to call for a pervasive transformation in my sense of the world.
So we should expect to find certain differences between the secular
music-lover listening to a Byrd mass while sipping a cocktail and someone
who listens to the mass with devotion in a liturgical setting. The first person may not adopt a mirroring response to the music at all, and even if
they do, their response may be overlaid by other, less religiously suggestive affects drawn from their context (the sense of peace may be transmuted into a sense of bodily well-being, for example). And even if the secular
music-lover does adopt a mirroring response, and this response is not
overlaid by other, less religiously resonant affects, they will presumably
fail to assign the response the particular meaning that it bears in its original
context: the generalised feeling of peace will not be understood as appropriate in the light of our status as forgiven.
By way of contrast with the secular music-lover, consider this religiously informed response to music:
I entered the little Portuguese village .... It was the evening and there
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was a full moon. It was by the sea. The wives of the fishermen were
going in procession to make a tour of all the ships, carrying candles
and singing what must certainly be very ancient hymns of a heartrending sadness .... There the conviction was suddenly borne in upon
me that Christianity is the religion of slaves, that slaves cannot help
belonging to it, and I among others.34
In this passage, Simone Weil is describing an episode of musical experience
that has, clearly, a religious context. She takes the hymns she hears to express
"heart-rending sadness," and this, we may suppose, is the "feeling" (in
Ridley's sense) which she experiences by way of a mirroring response to the
music. And she assigns this feeling a specifically religious meaning, influenced no doubt in part by the religious context, and also by her own preoccupations: this feeling reveals a quality of affective life that befits "slaves,"
and this is indeed how we ought to feel, she says, if we are Christians.
Significantly, Weil's identification with Christianity here proceeds initially
not by reference to some abstract credal characterisation of what Christians
stand for, but by reference to the "attitude" (of "slavery") that she takes to
typify the Christian life. To this extent, the passage seems to endorse the
thought, one we have explored already, that the quality of affective life inculcated by a religious tradition is central to the identity of the tradition, and not
merely derivative from its theoretical, dogmatic claims.
Having considered the secular music-lover and Simone Weil, I offer one
final example of how music may be appreciated, of a rather different character again:

Suppose that a captive in his prison, delivered to hatred and seeing
the sky only "beyond the rooftop," hears a Bach fugue .... He can not
doubt that this world of Bach exists, even if it is reserved for enjoyment by others. There is joy, and it is of little importance which particular objects manifest it. 35
Drawing again on the Ridley-Davies framework, we may suppose that the
captive recognises the expressive force of the music by way of a mirroring
response of joy. And the joy he experiences is, we may think, a "feeling"hence he can remark that "it is of little importance which particular objects
manifest [this joy]," implying that it does not have a particular material
object, and is instead free to range over an indeterminate range of such
objects (indeed what is there in his immediate environment that might
serve as its object?) This case seems to fall somewhere between those of the
cocktail-sipping secularist and Weil. The captive enters into the mirroring
response with real seriousness, since he takes the response to reveal something important about the possibilities of human experience. But he does
not commit himself to the thought that the affect he comes to feel has any
general application in human life. By contrast, in a religiously engaged
hearing of Byrd's Agnus Dei or the hymns in Weil's example, the listener
not only enters into the mirroring response (of peace or heart-rending sadne~'S) with a certain gravity, but takes the correlative quality of affective life
to be appropriate for human beings. So the listener described in this pas-
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sage remains, it seems, religiously unengaged (or at any rate, if this
response involves a kind of spiritual-cum-religious engagement, it is less
far-reaching than that found in our other examples, because it does not
involve some general conception of the human condition and the quality of
affective life that befits this condition). But at the same time, because his
reading of the mirroring response reveals a degree of existential seriousness, the captive's appreciation of the music is also to be distinguished
from that of the cocktail sipper.
Before proceeding to consider, more briefly, points (3) and (4) on our list
of themes drawn from Ridley and Davies, it is worth noting that the features of musical expressiveness that we have been discussing appear to be
somewhat distinctive of music. For example, because of their richer powers
of representation, a story or painting may well engender an affective state
that is targeted at some rather restricted state of affairs. Even stories concerning God, the source and goal of the whole creation, can be construed in
this relatively limited way, we may suppose, so that they engender patterns of felt response to God considered as a particular object, rather than
giving rise to a more general affective disposition. To this extent, nonmusical art forms may lack the sort of religious relevance that we have
been ascribing to music, that is, the relevance that derives from the generalisable character of the affects expressed in music.
Moreover, again because of their richer representational content, nonmusical art forms may well result in an empathic rather than a sympathetic
or mirroring response. For instance, if a story describes a person's grief
upon being bereaved, my response may well involve pity for this person
(and will not normally involve grief, in so far as I do not take myself to be
bereaved). By contrast, when my response is of the mirroring kind, I take
on the very affects which are expressed in the work. It may be that this feature of musical expressiveness is also important in understanding the distinctive character of music's religious relevance. At any rate, a mirroring
response can seem more intimate than an empathic response: the latter
kind of response directs my attention towards some more or less precisely
circumscribed state of affairs (the grieving person, for example); by contrast, a mirroring response appears to be simply a state of inwardness, one
which does not require me to feel joyful or depressed (or whatever) about
anything in particular. The depth of emotional experience that many people associate with music, in distinction from other art forms, is, at least in
part, I suggest, a consequence of this aspect of musical experience, whereby we simply mirror the movements of the music, rather than directing our
attention to an emotional object (something we are sad or happy about).
(Compare T.5. Eliot's remark: "You are the music while the music lasts.")36
If music does indeed speak to us with a special intimacy for these reasons,
that suggests once more that musical expressiveness may be particularly
important for the formation of a certain quality of affective life.
Point (3) on our list of the religiously significant features of musical
expressiveness recalled Ridley's claim that the affects expressed in music,
when grasped in a mirroring response, may exceed our powers of verb alisation. It is easy to imagine an objector protesting that Ridley has failed to
show how this sort of expressiveness is really grounded in the music. After
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all, on his own account, the resemblance between the dynamic qualities of
a piece of music and the expressive movements of bodies will be of a fairly
indeterminate character, enough to allow us to characterise the music as
say slow and effortful, and therefore sad, but prohibiting any more precise
identification of its expressive significance. However, suppose we grant
Ridley's claim that such mirroring responses are a mode of apprehension
of qualities in the music, and that capturing their expressive significance in
full may well exceed our powers of description. If he is right about this,
then a further dimension of music's religious potency comes into view. For
on these assumptions, it is at least possible that some religiously important
affects can be grasped by way of mirroring responses to music, but not by
verbal means. 37 Indeed, it may be that certain religiously important affects
can be grasped only by way of a particular musical tradition, or even, only
by way of a particular piece of music. In that case, music could prove to be
indispensable for the full articulation of the meaning of a religious tradition considered in terms of the quality of affective life that it commends.
Readers can no doubt test this thesis against their own musical experience.
Are there pieces of music, or traditions of musical expression, that communicate a quality of affective life, where at least part of what is communicated is relevant to the "attitude" that (say) Christians should display, and
where what is communicated in this respect cannot be expressed in all its
religiously relevant detail in any other way?
I tum now to point (4) on our list, the idea that the affects expressed in
music are lacking in self-reference and "uncluttered" by any impulse
towards action. There is, of course, a long-standing tradition which has
found aesthetic experience religiously or spiritually significant because it
fosters a kind of detachment, encouraging us to be absorbed in the work of
art for its own sake, and apart from any thought of its usefulness in satisfying the cravings of the ego. 3Il Ridley and Davies together provide a way of
articulating the idea that musical experience can free a person from self-referential concerns, though their account makes appeal not so much to the
character of aesthetic experience in general, as to the character of perceptual object directed moods. Hence Ridley notes, as we have seen, that mirroring responses to music necessarily lack any self-regarding character,
because they fail to pick out particular circumstances and their bearing on
the well-being of the subject. And for the same reason, we should expect to
find (as we evidently do) that musical affects are typically devoid of actionguiding content: a mirroring response to the sadness expressed in a piece
of music makes no reference to particular states of affairs, and therefore
invites no thought about how I might effect some change in things.
In these respects, we may well detect a further religiously suggestive
feature of musical expressiveness. For in so far as musical affects have this
character, then they involve a "transcending" of the ego-centric, actionguiding perspective of ordinary life, and this sort of transcendence may be
religiously important, in so far as the religions think it appropriate (not in
every circumstance, evidently) to adopt a contemplative attitude towards
the world, that is, an attitude that does not see the world as an object of
use, or take it as a resource for satisfying my desires. It is also worth recalling here the idea that the affects experienced in mirroring responses to
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music are typically mild in character. The mildness of musical affects
might also be deemed spiritually significant in some religious traditions, in
so far as extremes of emotion are considered unwholesome. But it seems
likely that the censuring of powerful emotions that is characteristic of some
religious traditions derives from a sense that such emotions are grounded
in egocentric concerns. And in that case, the mildness of musical affects
will not present a distinct consideration after all.
So far I have been exploring the religious relevance of musical affects in
so far as such affects help to foster the adoption of religiously appropriate
"attitudes" towards the world. Next, and more briefly, I would like to consider the possibility that musical affects may be religiously relevant in
helping to cultivate a certain quality of affective life in relationship to God
(or the sacred otherwise characterised).

IV. Extending the model
I have been considering the religious importance of musical affects considered as attitudes towards the world. But on some views, our attitudes
towards the world and towards God ought to be in some degree mutually
defining. And if that is so, then we should reckon with the possibility that
musical affects are directly relevant to a person's relationship to God (and
not relevant merely in so far as they suggest an attitude towards the world
that is religiously fitting). This association between the attitudes which are
apt in relationship to God and in relationship to the world arises most simply in so far as the world is considered as a theatre of divine activity, and
therefore revelatory of God. A particularly striking example of this sort of
approach is evident in Maimonides' treatment of the divine attributes.
Hence he writes that:
We see, e.g., how well He provides for the life of the embryo of living
beings; how He endows with certain faculties both the embryo itself
and those who have to rear it after its birth, in order that it may be
protected from death and destruction, guarded against all harm, and
assisted in the performance of all that is required [for its development]. Similar acts, when performed by us, are due to a certain emotion and tenderness called mercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to
be merciful.'9
Maimonides goes on to generalise this example to reach the conclusion that
"all attributes ascribed to God are attributes of His acts."40 Or more exactly
(as becomes clear later in his discussion), he proposes that the divine attributes involve either a reference to God's effects in the world (as in the passage just cited) or (where they concern the divine essence in itself) a denial
of certain creaturely properties of God. 41 So on this account, many of the
divine attributes can be read as compressed references to the way the
world works in general (in terms of the preservation of embryos, and so
on). And accordingly, in some cases at least, affective attitudes will be
transferable from God to the world, and vice versa. For example, if it is
appropriate to have confidence in the divine mercy, then it is appropriate
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to have confidence in the workings of the world, since God's being merciful comes down to the fact that the world works in certain ways. And in
that case, it seems possible that certain musical affects, in so far as they
imply a religiously appropriate attitude towards the world, will also thereby imply an appropriate attitude towards God.
It might be objected that this is to commend an idolatrous interpretation
of the signjficance of music: we are being invited to transfer attitudes that
are appropriate to the world to God; and these attihldes, furthermore, are
seen to have their origin in music, and not in some acknowledgement of
God and what God has done for us. On the first of these points, I would
agree, of course, that not every attitude towards the world will be applicable to God. Following Maimonides, I am suggesting that a theological
rationale can be provided for treating some attitudes in this way.
Specifically, if we follow Maimonides, then we may suppose that having
confidence in God's mercy logically commits a person to having confidence in the world's progress, because God's mercy is realised in his direction of the world. On the second point, I would recall what was said earlier
about the contribution of religious context to our appreciation of music.
Given such a context, it is possible to assign a precise religious meaning to
a mirroring response to music, a meaning which does recognise what God
has done for us.
For an example of a musically induced "feeling" being applied to God,
we may turn to John Paul II's "Letter to Artists."·2 The Pope writes that: "In
song, faith is experienced as vibrant joy, love, and confident expectation of
the saving intervention of God." Cast in the terms we have been using, we
could take John Paul to be saying that the "feelings" of joy and love can be
aroused by way of a mirroring response to music. And (reading our own
theory into his remarks somewhat) we might suppose that these feelings
are appropriate both as "attitudes" towards the world and in relationship
to God, because of certain specifically Christian truths. Thus because of
what we know of "the saving intervention of God," our everyday experience should be received in a spirit of love and joy; and these same affects
should also be displayed in relationship to God, not least because it is God
who confers this sort of significance upon our everyday experience. Here
the applicability of an affective attitude both in relationship to the world
and in relationship to God is grounded not so much in general truths concerning God's activity in the world (as in Maimonides) as in a specifically
Christian claim concerning the ultimate telos of human existence.
Remarkably, there is a whole tradition of spiritual formation which
seems to be founded upon the idea that such mood-like responses should
infonn our relationship to God. I am thinking here of an approach to spiritual direction that was widespread in Catholic circles at least until the middle years of the last century. In this tradition, it was common practice to
distinguish various phases of spiritual development (broadly, the purgative, illuminative and unitive) and to suppose that the later phases were
marked by a movement away from discursive forms of prayer towards a
state of wordless, affective contemplation. Expounding this general tradition in a text which served as a standard spiritual handbook in the early
year5 of the twentieth century, Adolphe Tanquerey writes that, as it
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matures, "the soul seeks solitude and silence; it gradually builds in the
heart a sanctuary where it finds God and converses with Him heart to
heart."43 In keeping with the larger spiritual tradition of which he is speaking, Tanquerey supposes that in this intimate relationship to God, one particular affective state will come to predominate. And the resulting condition, he writes, "soon extends to our whole life" so that it "persists all day
long," whatever else we may be doing. 44 Here Tanquerey seems to have in
mind a mood-like condition, to the extent that the predominant affect
extends to our experience in general; and it is through such "moods," he is
suggesting, that a person may converse with God "heart to heart." So here
we find a further way of taking "feelings" to be important in a person's
relationship to God, and accordingly a further way of developing the
thought that musical affects are at least in principle religiously significant.
Tanquerey's characterisation of these predominant affects as mood-like
suggests that they should inform not only our relationship to God but also
our dealings with the world (since they will persist through our day-to-day
activities). This suggests that Tanquerey's discussion, like the others we
have examined, invites, in certain cases, an association of the attitudes
applicable to God and those applicable to the world. And there is implicit in
his account a theological rationale for this association. In particular, he notes
that the character of the dominant affective state will vary from person to
person, and that for some the focal point of this state will be Christ's passion, and for others the eucharist, and so on.'5 This suggests that the
eucharist, the passion, or some other cardinal truth of the Christian faith is
taken to disclose the ultimate significance of human experience; and for this
reason, certain attitudes (joy, for example) can be deemed appropriate not
only in our relationship to God but also in our engagement with the world.

Conclusions
Schopenhauer famously thought that music carries metaphysical significance because the movements of a melody offer a kind of analogue for the
movements of the will as it seeks satisfaction first in one thing and then in
another. Hence he comments that: "the nature of man consists in this, that
his will strives, is satisfied and strives anew, and so on for ever.... And corresponding to this the nature of melody is a constant digression and deviation from the key-note in a thousand ways ... "46 The account developed in
this paper is founded upon a different model of musical expressiveness,
one which appeals to the resemblance between the movements of music
and human expressive behaviour (rather than a resemblance between
music and the movements of the will). On this account, there is no need to
adopt Schopenhauer's Buddhistic metaphysic to find music metaphysically suggestive. It is enough to note a number of proposals drawn from contemporary philosophy of music.
Firstly, the affective states expressed in music lack material objects, and
can be grasped in "feelings" formed by way of a mirroring response. If that
is so, then music can help to inculcate a certain quality of affective life, and
this is enough to establish its religious significance in principle; for the faith
traditions are concerned, of course, not only that believers should profess
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right doctrine, but also that they should exhibit a correlative quality of
affective life in their dealings with the world. Moreover, in so far as musical affects are lacking in action-guiding content, then they may have a part
to play in fostering a "spiritual" or contemplative attitude towards the
world; and in so far as they cannot be replicated by other means, they may
even prove to be indispensable for the full articulation of a faith perspective, considered in terms of the "attitude" towards the world that it seeks
to commend. Moreover, on certain quite widely adopted theological
assumptions, some of the attitudes that are rightly displayed in relationship to the world should also be displayed in relationship to God, and in
this respect too, the mirroring responses engendered by music may prove
to be religiously resonant. Lastly, we have also explored the theme that the
religious potency of music in these respects may be unrivalled by other art
forms, especially in so far as musical affects are more readily generalis able,
and are experienced more intimately, than those evoked by other art
forms.
That music is religiously powerful is for many people an obvious datum
of experience, and it is natural to wonder how music can impinge so profoundly upon human lives. This paper shows, I hope, that the affinity
between our musical experience and the life of faith is not simply a "brute"
fact, but can be illuminated in some degree using the categories supplied
by contemporary philosophy of musicY
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